Shock in Ankara – Putin punishes the Turkish pendulum: Harsh “expulsion” of a ship in Sochi following Erdogan’s turn toward the U.S.A.
Russia cited security reasons due to ongoing military exercises in the Black Sea region.
An unprecedented diplomatic and naval crisis has erupted between Turkey and Russia, as the Turkish ferry Seabridge, which departed from Trabzon on November 5 with 20 passengers, was forced to return to Turkey after Russian authorities denied it entry to the Port of Sochi, dramatically ending the planned resumption of the route after 14 years of suspension.
The ship remained anchored for more than two days off the port, while the passengers, mostly Russian citizens, were unable to disembark.
The situation caused intense concern and confusion, as Russia invoked security reasons owing to the continuing military drills in the Black Sea area.
The company Lider Group, owner of the Seabridge, stated that the decision to return was also due to limited fuel reserves, as the delay consumed approximately 25 tons.
According to Turkiye Today, the company is now considering legal action against the Russian authorities for the losses caused by the denial of port access.
Despite Seabridge’s difficulties, the cruise ship Astoria Grande, also under Russian management, successfully docked at Sochi and disembarked 1,100 passengers during the same period, raising questions about Russia’s justification concerning the “unsuitability” of the area for passenger operations.
The failure to relaunch the Trabzon–Sochi route represents a setback for Turkey–Russia maritime connections and underscores rising tensions in the Black Sea amid military exercises and geopolitical frictions.
The 18 Russian passengers of the Seabridge will be returned to Russia on a flight covered by the Turkish company, while legal experts deem it likely that Lider Group will seek compensation under international maritime law.
This development highlights the sensitive geopolitical nature of maritime transportation in the region and underscores the growing challenges for Turkey in its effort to revive old sea routes and strengthen economic ties with Russia.
“Nuclear bomb”
This incident marks the first strong reaction to Turkey’s pendulum diplomacy, swinging alternately toward the West and the East.
Indicative of Ankara’s shift in foreign policy is the fact that Turkey is beginning cooperation with the United States and South Korea for the construction of its second nuclear power plant in Sinop, on the Black Sea coast, a project that until recently was expected to be undertaken by the Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom.
This change signifies a major reversal in Ankara’s energy policy within a year and opens a new phase in the relations between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and U.S. President Donald Trump.
Until late 2024, senior Turkish and Russian officials publicly discussed extending their cooperation from Turkey’s first nuclear plant in Akkuyu to Sinop.
Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev had then declared that Erdogan had made a political decision to assign the Sinop project to the Russian company, using the same “build-own-operate” (BOO) model implemented in Akkuyu.
Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar also described Rosatom as “well-positioned” for the project, in statements made last summer.
This expectation began to change after Erdogan’s visit to Washington on September 25, 2025.
During the trip, Turkey and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) at the White House for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Trump and Erdogan attended the signing ceremony together with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
Later, Turkish officials described the document as the beginning of a new process of bilateral cooperation in the nuclear field.
Following the visit, on October 2, Bayraktar announced that the United States and South Korea had joined the ongoing discussions on the Sinop project. Speaking on CNN Türk, he said a tripartite cooperation model among Ankara, Washington, and Seoul was being considered, and that Turkey sought access to technology and competitive pricing.
He added that the U.S. could contribute to both large reactor systems and the development of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
The participation of American and South Korean partners coincided with Ankara’s efforts to diversify its energy relations.
That same week, Erdogan and Trump held a closed-door meeting, during which, according to Turkish officials, Trump urged Turkey to reduce its oil and natural gas imports from Russia.
Energy analysts in Ankara note that this message aligns with Washington’s broader policy to curb Russian influence in strategic energy sectors.
Blow to Russia
For Moscow, this shift constitutes a blow.
Russian diplomats had long considered Sinop an extension of the Akkuyu project, where construction is carried out by Rosatom under a 60-year license.
Rosatom teams conducted studies in Sinop up until early 2024.
Turkish officials now state that the future work at the site will be opened to tender, and the project will not automatically be assigned to Russia.
Bayraktar has repeatedly emphasized that Turkey wants low production costs and direct participation of Turkish companies in nuclear construction.
He underlined that in the Akkuyu project, over $7 billion of the total investment originated from Turkish industry, and similar results are expected in Sinop.
The renewed discussions with the United States coincide with Ankara’s broader effort to reshape its energy supply.
Over the past year, Turkey has signed long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreements with Swiss and Australian companies and expanded its storage capacity to reduce dependence on Russian pipeline gas.
Government officials describe the new nuclear partnership with Washington as another step in that direction.
The exact structure of the new partnership has not yet been finalized.
Sources from the Turkish Ministry of Energy report that both the United States and South Korea have presented financing and reactor design proposals.
Ankara is expected to decide in 2026 whether to proceed with a joint proposal or select a main contractor.
Officials do not rule out limited technical participation from Russia, but stress that the project will be guided by the principle of “maximum benefit for Turkey.”
This policy revision also reflects the lessons learned from the Akkuyu experience.
Opposition lawmakers and energy experts have criticized the project’s terms, under which Rosatom retains full ownership, and Turkey is obliged to purchase the generated energy at predetermined prices.
The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has described the agreement as an arrangement that leaves Turkey dependent on a foreign operator.
Local control and technology transfer
In contrast, the government insists that every new nuclear project will be structured to ensure greater local control and technology transfer.
The change in nuclear policy forms part of a broader reorientation in Turkey’s relations with the major powers.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Ankara has maintained its trade with Moscow, while simultaneously strengthening cooperation with Western energy partners.
Under the 2010 intergovernmental agreement that initiated the project, Rosatom finances, constructs, owns, and operates the Akkuyu plant.
The Russian stake in the project company Akkuyu Nükleer A.Ş. cannot fall below 51%, but up to 49% is available for sale.
Rosatom has begun talks with potential Turkish and foreign investors for this minority share, valued at around $10 billion, though no deal has been reached so far.
U.S. and European sanctions, imposed after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have made potential buyers and lenders cautious.
Industry analysts note that the scale of the investment, combined with the risk of secondary sanctions, has limited the number of interested parties.
Rosatom was expected to transfer about $7 billion this year to maintain construction progress, but the funds have not arrived.
Without them, Ankara has struggled to secure alternative financing.
The company has requested new tax exemptions, customs facilities, and state guarantees from Turkey.
Officials in Ankara have responded cautiously, delaying negotiations and prolonging the funding shortfall.
It is not the first time the project has faced financial obstacles.
In 2022, $2 billion out of a planned $3 billion transfer from Russia was blocked by U.S. authorities during processing through Citibank and JPMorgan, following intervention by the U.S. Department of Justice, a sign of Washington’s close monitoring of Russia–Turkey energy cooperation.
Western sanctions have also disrupted supply chains.
The German industrial giant Siemens, one of the early suppliers of key components, declared it could not ship certain equipment due to export licensing issues.
Rosatom has since sought Chinese alternatives for some components.
It is clear that Turkey’s decision to reassess Russia’s role in its second nuclear plant is influenced not only by its desire to move closer to the West, but also by the delays, supply difficulties, and financing problems Russia faces in the Akkuyu project.
For Russia, the loss of the Sinop project weakens its influence over Turkey’s long-term energy plans.
For the United States, participation in the project would mark a return to a sector it has not been involved in for decades.
For Turkey, this decision may bring new technology and financing options, but also increased scrutiny over how nuclear cooperation fits within its overall foreign policy framework.
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Οι απόψεις που εκφράζονται στα σχόλια των άρθρων δεν απηχούν κατ’ ανάγκη τις απόψεις της ιστοσελίδας μας, το οποίο ως εκ τούτου δεν φέρει καμία ευθύνη. Για τα άρθρα που αναδημοσιεύονται εδώ με πηγή, ουδεμία ευθύνη εκ του νόμου φέρουμε καθώς απηχούν αποκλειστικά τις απόψεις των συντακτών τους και δεν δεσμεύουν καθ’ οιονδήποτε τρόπο την ιστοσελίδα.
